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ETHICS
I

Attorney-Client Confidentiality and
Harm to Third Persons
By Philip Halpern

The Dilemma
What should a criminal defense lawyer
do upon learning as a result of a confidential communication with a clie nt that a third
person may be in imminent danger of
death? Suppose the client tells the lawyer
that hours before he stabbed a child whom
he left in an isolated area. When asked by
the lawyer about the extent of injury, the
client responds, " I cut he r, I'm not sure
how badly."
In this situation, the instinct of a nonlawyer would be to pic k up the phone a nd
call the police to tell them that a critically
injured person may be found at a particular
location. Initially, a lawyer's instincts
would probably be similar. However, having reached for the phone, the lawyer might
hesitate, saying to himself or herself: " I
can 't disclose this infom1ation; disclosure
would be contrary to professional ethics."
What should the lawyer do? After examining the guidance offered by the pertinent provisions of the A .B.A.'s 1969 Code
of Professional Responsibility and its 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, I' ll
suggest what I think is the appropriate
response.

Alternative Courses of Action
l. Tell all without qualification. Prompt
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disclosure of the information to the authorities could save the life of an innocent child.
The lawyer hesitates, despite the apparent
urgency of the situation, because of a
professional obligation to preserve the confidentiality of information supplied by a
client. The Code defines the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality in Canon 4 which
states: "A Lawyer Should Preserve th e
Confidences and Secrets of a Clie nt." Confidence is defined to include communication protected by the attorney-client
testimonial privilege, while secret is defined more broadly to include othe r informat io n obtained as a result of the
professional relationship not covered by the
privilege.
DR 4-101 (B) requires that a lawyer must
not " reveal a confidence or secret of his
client," nor may the lawyer ." use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client." T he informatio n
imparted to our hypothet ical lawyer seems
to qualify clearly as a confidence protected
by both the Code and the attorney-client
testimonial privilege . There are, however,
exceptions to the non-disclosure rule, two
of which seem pertinent to the situation at
hand . A lawyer '·may·· (note the permissive usage) reveal confide nces or secrets:
lll when permitted by the Disciplinary

·Rules or required by law or court order; and
[2] when they relate to the intention of his
client to commit a crime.
With regard to the first exception, no
obligation exists under the Disciplinary
Rules or extrinsic law that requires disclosure . There are a line of cases requiring
defense attorneys to preserve and tum over
to the authorities physical evidence adverse
to their client, even if that evidence is
obtained as a result of a confidential communication. The duty to do so typically is
founded upon criminal statutes prohibiting
the concealment of evidence. However, no
physical evidence is involved in the situation at hand and no general legal obligation
exists to prevent harm to third parties. With
regard to the exception permitting a lawyer
to reveal the intent of a client to commit a
crime, that does not appear applicable
since the information relates to a past
criminal act rather than the intent to commit a future crime.
The 1983 Model Rules similarly create
an expansive zone of confidentiality. Model
Ru le 1.6 states that a lawyer "shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client." Rule 1. 6 (b) permits, but
does not require, a lawyer to reveal confidential information "to the extent the lawyer reasonabl y believes necessary to
prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." However, as with the
Code, breach of the confidentiality principle is permitted, not required, and only to
prevent a future criminal act, not to mitigate the consequences of a past criminal
act.
Accordingly, the Code and the Model
Rules seem to counsel against, perhaps
prohibit, the lawyer's disclosing the location of the child to the police as being
contrary to the obligation to mai ntain confidentiality of client information.
2. Remain silent. Under one interpretation of professional ethics , a lawyer should
sit back and do nothing, although he or she
possesses information which might save the
life of a child . I am not comfortable with
that resolution . It is a simplistic and mechanical response to a complex moral and
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professional dilemma.
The duty of lawyers to safeguard the
secrets of clients is most frequently defended on the ground of social utility. The
guaranty of confidentiality is said to encourage persons in need of legal help to
seek legal assistance that they mig ht
otherwise fail to obtain. Additionally, it is
claimed that the assurance of confidentiality is needed to promote full disclosure of
all relevant facts essential to proper representation. In sum, the argument is that
society gains from an effective legal system, for which attorney confidentiality is a
prerequisite.
There are two objections to this consequentialist position. One is empirical. Evidence is absent showing that effective legal
representation would be imperiled if law-
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yers had an obligation to protect innocent
third parties from serious harm, even if it
meant divulging confidential information.
Lawyers recite the principle of attorneyclient confidentiality so frequently that
ritualistic incantation threatens to displace
objective analysis. We come to believe that
the principle is monolithic and inviolable,
when it is not. For instance, under the Code
and Model Rules, a lawyer is free to reveal
confidential client information in order to
defend against an adverse claim, to protect
his or her reputation or to succeed in a fee
dispute with a client. One wonders at the
cost-benefit analysis that led to this result
and who did the weighing.
The other objection does not call into
question the assumption that clients will
consult with lawyers earlier and more fully
if lawyers have no duty to act to protect
innocent third persons. Even granting that
assumption, to risk one person's life in
order to help a client or benefit society by
improving the legal system, according to
this objection , reflects an erroneous
weighing of conflicting values.
I don't mean to suggest that the arguments supporting attorney confidentiality
are not strong, because they are. However,
the principle of confidentiality and its
underlying values should not be treated as
absolute or uniformly superior to other
values w ith which they may come into
conflict. What is needed is an approach that
acknowledges the conflicting values and
seeks to accommodate them. In that spirit,
let us consider other alternatives open to
our hypothetical lawyer.
3 . Disclosure based on express consent
of the client. Of course, if the client
consents to the disclosure, there is not a
problem under either the Code or the
Model Rules. The moral dilemma is
avoided. However, valid consent requires
consultation with the client and full explanation of the probable consequences of
the client's waiver of confidentiality. The
exigencies of the situation may not afford
sufficient time for such consultation, and
the client may withhold consent after full
discussion.
4. Disclosure based on implied consent
of the client. Model Rule 1.6 allows dis-

closure of confidential information that is
"impliedly authorized in order to carry out
the representation." Saving the victim's life
could be in the client's interest by avoiding a
charge of homicide. However, disclosure
will not always be to the client's advantage
a nd may seriously disadvantage the client.
For instance, disclosure calculated to save
the victim's life may not achieve its intended effect (the victim may already be
dead) a nd such disclosure may provide a
vital evidentiary link between the client a nd
the crime. From the client's viewpoint,
although a conviction for assault or attempted homicide is better than one for
homicide, no conviction is best of all.
He nce, if the lawyer is to furnish confidential client information to the prosecutor or
police, on the ground that the lawyer
reasonably believes that divulgence is necessary to prevent imminent danger to human life, it must be done in a manner
reasonably designed to protect the client's
interests.
5. Disclosure with an agreemem against
anriburion. I suggest that the lawyer should
advise the prosecuting authorities or the
police that he or she possesses confidential
infom1ation that may save the life of an
innocent person, but that which the attorney is free to disclose only upon agreement
that such info rmation will not be attributed
to eithe r the lawyer or the lawyer's clie nt. If
such agreement is obta ined , disclosure will
serve the public inte rest and perhaps the
interests of the client; at least hann to the
client will be minimized.

Support for the Proposed
Non-Attribution Rule
An agreement forbidding attribution to
the client or the clie nt 's attorney of confidential information where divulgence was
reasonably believed necessary to prevent
imminent and serious danger to human life
finds support in cases requiring defense
counsel to tum over to the prosecutor
adverse physical evidence. For instance, in
People v. Meredith, a California case, the
court required a lawyer, whose investigator
recovered the victim 's partially burned wallet from a trash can based on information

Prosecutors should
develop and publicize
to the defense bar
policies with respect
to the receipt and
non-attribution of confidential info171Ultion.

supplied by the client, to turn the wallet
over to the prosecutor.
The cout1 also held that the wallet was
admissible in evidence. More difficult was
the admissibility of testimony concerning
its location, since finding the wal let was the
result of a client's confidential communication protected by the evidentiary priv ilege. In orde r to safeguard this privileged
communication, the court suggested that in
offering the physical evidence the defe nse
lawyer had turned ove r to it, the prosecution should present it in a manner " which
avoids revealing the content of attorneyclie nt communications o r the orig inal
source of information . . . Whe n it is not
possible to elicit such testimony without
identifying the Lsource j as the defendant 's
attorney or investigator, the defe ndant may
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be willing to ente r a stipulation which will
simply inform the jury as to the relevant
location or condition of the evidence... .
[The] prosecution should not be permitted
to reject the stipulation."

The Role of Prosecutors
Prosecutors should develop and publicize
to the defense bar policies with respect to
the receipt and non-attribution of confidential information where divulgence is reasonably believed necessary to prevent
imminent danger to human life.
Additionally, if a n attorney divulges confidential information for the purpose of
saving human life without an agreement of
non-attribution , it would be shon-sighted
and wrong for a prosecutor to attempt to use
the communication against the accused.
The predictable consequence of such action
would be embarrassme nt of the particular
defense attorney involved, and , more importantly, deterring othe r members of the
defense bar from coming forward with
confidential information in similar circumstances. Additionally, the predictable c hilling effect on defense lawyers may not be
offset by any evidentiary gain to the prosecutor, since such confide ntial inforn1ation
may not be usable at trial even without an
agreement of non-attribution. If the information is protected by attorney-client privilege, any disclosure of th at information
w ithout a valid waiver of the privilege by
the client may well leave the privilege
intact.

Conclusion
The arguments in support of attorneyclie nt confidentiality are strong , but they do
not always justify sile nce whe n third pe rsons are threate ned with serious and imntinent harm. Creative solutions are needed to
reconcile conflict between preserving
client secrets a nd preventing harm to
othe rs.
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